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Abstract 
In modern firms the use of contests as an incentive device is ubiquitous. Nonetheless, 
experimental research shows that in the laboratory subjects routinely make suboptimal decisions 
in contests even to the extent of making negative returns. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate how earning the endowment, demographic differences and individual preferences 
impact behavior in contests. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects 
expend costly resources (bids) to attain an award (prize). In line with other laboratory studies of 
contests, our results show that subjects overbid relative to theoretical predictions and incur 
substantial losses as a result. Making subjects earn their initial resource endowments mitigates 
the amount of overbidding and thus increases efficiency. Overbidding is linked to gender, with 
women bidding higher than men and having lower average earnings. Other demographic 
information, such as religiosity, and individual preferences, such as preferences towards winning 
and risk, also influence behavior in contests. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of contests as an incentive device has garnered much attention by researchers. 
Certainly, competition as an incentive device often has advantages over other non-competitive 
incentive schemes (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). Even so, these 
advantages may be eliminated if the agents in these situations make systematically inefficient 
choices. Since the original studies of Bull et al. (1987) and Millner and Pratt (1989), a number of 
laboratory studies have shown that subjects make significantly higher bids in contests than 
predicted; for a comprehensive review see Dechenaux et al. (2015). In some instances, the 
magnitude of overbidding is so high that subjects make negative expected payoffs.  
Contests have been used to investigate effort choices of workers (Lazear and Rosen 
1981) and the allocation of resources to achieve a goal such as research and development 
funding (Harris and Vickers, 1985, 1987). To motivate the present study we focus on the 
allocation of resources but our results could also be applied to the context of effort choices and, 
as such, add to a quickly growing literature about the impact of competition and choices 
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011). We find the allocation of resources 
question to be of particular importance because the fact that agents in these instances make 
decisions which generate negative payoffs is of paramount concern to the organizations which 
may employ contests as an incentive device. In turn, this inefficient use of resources constitutes a 
problem of moral hazard as managers of organizations must determine the best way to endow 
subordinates with resources used to perform productive tasks (e.g., research and development). If 
the way that managers endow subordinates with resources is a causal factor in the misuse of 
resources then it would be prudent for the manager to provide resources in a circumspect way. 
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As such, the results of this research should be of interest to both management researchers and 
management practitioners alike. 
In this study, we examine several variables which may have an impact on the use of 
costly resources in contests. These are endowment differences, demographic differences and 
differences of individual preferences. To investigate these variables we design a laboratory 
experiment which allows us to systematically vary the origin of the endowment between a 
windfall endowment and an earned endowment before subjects participate in a lottery contest. 
We also capture demographic data on decision makers, such as gender, religiosity, major, 
economics classes and age, as well as individual preferences, such preferences towards winning 
and risk. 
Our experiment results indicate that when subjects earn their endowments bidding 
decreases by 11-16% compared to the windfall endowments. Demographic characteristics, such 
as gender and religiosity, and individual preferences, such as preferences towards winning and 
risk, are significant predictors of subjects’ bidding behavior in contests. We find that subjects 
who indicate higher utility for winning or higher tolerance for risk make higher bids in contests. 
Surprisingly, demographic effects are even stronger than treatment effects, with women making 
25% higher bids and more religious subjects making 26% lower bids. Furthermore, when 
including these demographic variables in our analysis, we find that a large portion of the 
treatment effects are subsumed by the demographic effects. 
This study adds to the understanding of two phenomena in the literature: (1) overbidding 
relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and (2) heterogeneous behavior of 
contestants (Sheremeta, 2013; Dechenaux et al., 2015). We find that significant portion of 
overbidding can be explained by the fact that subjects receive windfall endowments (house 
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money) before participating in contests. Additionally, we find that demographic differences, such 
as gender and religiosity, as well as heterogeneous preferences, such as preferences towards 
winning and risk, have a significant impact on bidding and thus can explain heterogeneous 
behavior of contestants. Also, our paper contributes to a large literature on gender differences 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009) and the growing literature on religion and economic behavior 
(Hoffmann, 2013).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review. 
Section 3 details the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 reports the results of the 
experiment. Lastly, Section 5 concludes and suggests directions for future research. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The literature on contests has generally fallen into one of three categories: selection into 
contests, performance in contests, and efficiency of contests. Our study here focuses mostly on 
the last category which has received significantly less attention in the recent surge of research on 
contests (see Dechenaux et al., 2015). 
A number of studies have focused on how people self-select into contests depending on 
individual preferences and demographic characteristics. This strain of literature has mostly been 
driven by the findings of gender differences in the decision to enter into competitive situations 
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). In particular, this line of literature has found that when given 
the choice, women more than men tend to select out of competitive compensation schemes and 
into schemes which reward individual productive behavior (e.g., piece-rate).1 These findings are 
important because they suggest an explanation for why so few women are represented in high 
                                                 
1 The lone exception is the study by Price (2010) where the author fails to replicate the findings of Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) using the same experimental design. 
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paying competitive careers.2 In addition to gender, Dohmen and Falk (2011) find that when 
subjects have a choice between a fixed payment and a contest, they are more likely to enter the 
contest if they are less risk-averse, more productive and more optimistic. Bartling et al. (2009) 
and Balafoutas et al. (2012) further document that, controlling for beliefs, inequality averse and 
spiteful subjects are less likely to enter contests. In summary, the findings of the literature 
indicate that people self-select into contests depending on individual preferences and 
demographic characteristics. 
Studies examining performance in contests are mostly based on three canonical models: a 
lottery contest of Tullock (1980), a rank-order tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and an 
all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989). The common finding from studies on lottery 
contests and all-pay auctions is that subjects routinely overbid (equivalent to over-exerting 
effort) relative to theoretical predictions.3 Sheremeta (2013) reviews 30 contest experiments and 
finds overbidding in 28 of those experiments, with the median overbidding rate of 72%. In rank-
order tournaments overbidding is not as severe (Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Orrison et al., 2004; 
Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011), but it is still present in some studies (Chen et al., 2011; Cason et 
al., 2013).4 
As noted earlier, this study is more closely related to the literature on efficiency of 
contests. Recently, there have been several attempts to reduce overbidding in contests and thus to 
enhance efficiency. Lugovskyy et al. (2010) allow subjects to have an extensive learning 
experience that results in added efficiency. Group decision-making has also been investigated as 
                                                 
2 For a thorough review of the gender and competition literature, see Niederle and Vesterlund (2011).  
3 Some studies that document significant overbidding in contests are done by Davis and Reilly (1998), Potters et al. 
(1998), Sheremeta (2010, 2011), Sheremeta and Zhang (2010), Price and Sheremeta (2011), Cason et al. (2012), 
Mago et al. (2013, 2015), Savikhin and Sheremeta (2013), and Chowdhury et al. (2014). 
4 A possible explanation why the magnitude of overbidding is not as severe in rank-order tournaments is that in 
these tournaments subjects effort is distorted by a random noise and efforts have a convex cost structure; see 
Chowdhury et al. (2014) for a discussion. 
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a means for enhancing efficiency (Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010). However, even extensive 
learning and group decision-making do not completely eliminate the overbidding phenomenon. 
Finally, Sheremeta (2011) shows that constraining individual budgets (and thus constraining the 
strategy space) can reduce overbidding in contests, but such a mechanism is very unlikely to be 
effective in the world of competitive capital markets where it is relatively easy to borrow money 
(D’Avolio, 2002). 
Our study examines whether overbidding can be reduced and efficiency enhanced when 
subjects earn their initial resource endowment. The idea that costly decisions may be influenced 
by the origin and, in particular, the effort by which the endowment is received is attributed to 
Locke (1978). The idea is clear: subjects who have to work or earn money to make decisions in 
the experiment may choose to make different decisions than subjects who receive money for 
free. The experimental evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. In dictator games, 
researchers have found that earning the endowment decreases subject’s contributions (Cherry et 
al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2006). Earning the endowment has also been shown to have an 
effect on the risk taking behavior (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) and behavior of subjects in the 
second-price auction (Jacquemet et al., 2009). In public good games, Muehlbacher and Kirchler 
(2009) and Harrison (2007) document that subjects who earn (or use their own) money are less 
likely to contribute to the public good.5  In summary, it appears that most of these studies 
document that subjects who earn their endowments behave more in line with standard Nash 
equilibrium predictions.  
  
                                                 
5 In contrast, some researchers do not find any significant effect of the endowment origin on subjects’ behavior in 
public goods and redistribution games (e.g. Clark, 1998, 2002; Rutström and Williams, 2000; Cherry et al., 2005). 
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3. Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures 
The experiment is based on the seminal rent-seeking lottery contest of Tullock (1980). 
We chose this model for several reasons. First, as we already mentioned, the lottery contest of 
Tullock (1980) is the seminal model of rent-seeking and prior research shows that subjects 
systematically overbid in these contests resulting in compromised efficiency. Second, to the 
extent that an agent’s overbidding is caused by ancillary concerns such as the thrill of winning, 
demographic effects, or some form of conspicuous consumption the agent’s actions constitute a 
moral hazard problem for the principle. Whereas the principle’s interests lie in ensuring that 
costly resources are used efficiently (i.e., to ensure expected profit maximization), this 
environment is of concern to managerial technicians which we find particularly attractive. 
Finally, this particular model provides clear theoretical predictions for which to measure 
efficiency, while the structure of the contest is easy to understand for subjects in the laboratory. 
In a simple lottery contest, there are n risk-neutral players who compete for a prize value 
of v. Each player i makes an irreversible bid bi in order to increase the probability of winning the 
prize, which is modeled with the lottery contest success function pi = bi/∑bj. The expected payoff 
for player i is equal to the probability of player i winning, pi, times the prize valuation, v, minus 
bid, bi, i.e. E(πi) = piv - bi. The symmetric Nash equilibrium bid is b* = v(n-1)/n2 and the 
equilibrium expected payoff is E(π*) = v/n2. It is important to emphasize that there are no 
asymmetric equilibria (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011) and the symmetric equilibrium is 
unique (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997). 
In each treatment of our experiment, there are n=4 players competing with each other for 
the prize of v = 120 experimental francs. Therefore, the equilibrium bid is b* = 22.5 and the 
expected payoff is E(π*) = 7.5. A key feature of our experiment is that there is no theoretical 
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reason why bidding would be different based upon how the subjects receive their endowments. 
Therefore, the equilibrium bid is constant across our treatments since it does not depend on how 
the subjects are endowed (see Table 1). 
We define three treatments based on how the subjects are endowed with resources in 
which to make bids. In the baseline Gift treatment, subjects received a free endowment as a show 
up fee of $20 to play the lottery contest for 30 periods, 5 of which were randomly selected for 
payment at the end of the experiment. In the Earn treatment, subjects earned their endowments 
through a real effort task. Specifically, the subjects are given the opportunity to add up sets of 
five randomly generated two-digit numbers by hand, as quickly as possible. 6  In the Earn 
treatment, subjects received $0.85 per problem that they correctly answered during a timed ten-
minute period. This piece-rate was chosen so that on average the subjects would attain a similar 
endowment to that of the other two treatments. Finally, in the Yardstick treatment, subjects 
earned their endowments through the same real effort task, however, this time subjects received a 
$20 if they correctly solved more problems than a predetermined amount in a timed ten-minute 
period.7 This predetermined hurdle was set at 2 problems but the subjects were not made aware 
of this fact. This extremely low hurdle was chosen so that all subjects would earn the $20 
endowment.  
The experiment involved 216 undergraduate subjects from Purdue University. The 
computerized experimental sessions were conducted in the Vernon Smith Experimental 
Economics Laboratory using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran 6 sessions of each of the three 
                                                 
6 This task is commonly used in the experimental literature because it is easy to explain, and there is substantial 
variability in individual performance that is due partly to skill and partly to effort (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
Cason et al., 2010). 
7 The Yardstick treatment was meant as a robustness check of the impact of earning an endowment on the propensity 
to bid. As in the Earn treatment, ex-ante subjects were tasked with finding the correct sums, but ex-post they were 
paid the same amount as in the Gift treatment. The two treatments were used as both a consistency check and as a 
way of ensuring that the variance of the endowment remains low so as not to convolute the results. As we will see, 
the Earn and Yardstick treatments produce similar behavior. 
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treatments. In each session, there were a total of 12 subjects and the session proceeded in five 
parts (or four parts in the Gift treatment). Instructions, available in the Appendix, were given to 
subjects at the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the instructions aloud. 
In the first part of the experiment, subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar to 
Holt and Laury (2002).8 This method was used to elicit subjects’ risk preferences. In the second 
part, subjects in Earn and Yardstick treatments earned money through adding up sets of five 
randomly generated two-digit numbers by hand. In the Gift treatment all subjects automatically 
were given the $20 endowment. In the third part, after learning how much money they have 
received, subjects participated in a total of 30 periods of the lottery contest. At the beginning of 
each period, subjects were randomly re-grouped to form a 4-player group. Subjects were then 
allowed to make bids between 0 and 120 for a prize of 120 francs. After all subjects submitted 
their bids, the computer chose the winner by implementing a simple lottery rule: the chance of 
receiving the prize was calculated as the number of francs a subject bids divided by the total 
number of francs all 4 subjects in the group bid. In the fourth part of the experiment, similar to 
Sheremeta (2010), subjects were asked to bid for a prize with a value of zero francs. Subjects 
were told that they would be informed whether they won the contest or not and that all subjects 
would have to pay their bids. This procedure was used to measure how important it is for 
subjects to win when winning is costly and there is no monetary reward for winning. Lastly, in 
the fifth part of the experiment, subjects were asked to fill out a short demographic 
questionnaire. 
                                                 
8 Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff 
with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across 
all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 0% chance of winning $3 and a 100% chance of winning $0, while the last 
lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. 
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At the conclusion of the experiment, 1 of the 15 lottery choices subjects made in part one 
was randomly selected for payment. Subjects were also paid for 5 of the 30 periods in the lottery 
contest and for the 1 decision they made for a prize of zero francs. The five rounds of the lottery 
contest were selected randomly by picking five numbers out of a bingo cage. The earnings were 
converted into US dollars at the rate of 60 francs to $1. Average earnings were $20.37 per 
subject and the experiment lasted for about 60 minutes. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior 
Table 1 summarizes average bids and payoffs. Overall, subjects in all treatments 
significantly overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction (all p-values < 0.01).9 As a 
result of significant overbidding, average payoffs are negative. The persistence of overbidding is 
also shown in Figure 1, displaying the average bid over 30 periods of the experiment. Although 
there is a declining trend (suggesting learning), even in the last periods of the experiment 
subjects continue to substantially overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction.10 Such 
significant overbidding is consistent with previous findings of lottery contest experiments 
(Sheremeta, 2013; Dechenaux et al., 2015). 
It is also important to emphasize that individual bids appear completely inconsistent with 
play of a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. Figure 2 displays the distribution of the 
average bid by subject in each treatment. Subjects are sorted in increasing order by the average 
                                                 
9 We ran a random effects model on a constant with clustered standard errors at the session level for each treatment. 
The constant coefficients for each treatment are higher than the predicted theoretical values as in Table 1 (all p-
values < 0.01). 
10 Based on the estimation of a random effects model where the dependent variable is a bid and the independent 
variables are a constant and a period trend, we find that the period trend is significant in two out of the three 
treatments (p-value < 0.01 for Yardstick and Earnings; p-value = 0.12 for Gift). 
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bid, which is indicated by solid line. The error bars represent standard deviations of bids for each 
subject over all 30 periods. Therefore, by focusing on the solid line one can see the cumulative 
empirical distribution of the average bid across subjects (signifying between-subjects variation), 
while by focusing on the error bars one can get a sense of the degree of within-subject variation. 
Examining Figure 2, one can clearly conclude that there is a very high degree of both between-
subjects and within-subject variation, which is consistent with previous findings of contest 
experiments (Sheremeta, 2013; Dechenaux et al., 2015). 
Since the subjects play the contest game for 30 periods it is interesting to investigate how 
the subject’s choices vary as the experiment periods progress. Table 2 displays, by treatment, the 
measures of between-subjects and within-subject variation for the first half and the second half 
of the experiment. The between-subjects variation measure is calculated as the absolute 
difference between the individual bid in period t and the average group bid in period t, averaged 
over all periods of the experiment. The within-subject variation measure is calculated as the 
absolute difference between the individual bid in period t and period t-1, averaged over all 
periods of the experiment. Both measures are very similar across treatments. Also, the between-
subjects variation is similar in the first half and the second half of the experiment, suggesting that 
there is a persistent variation of bidding behavior between subjects. On the other hand, the 
within-subject variation is lower in periods 16-30 than in periods 1-15, suggesting that learning 
takes place. This kind of within-subject learning has also been documented by Davis and Reilly 
(1998), Sheremeta and Zhang (2010), Chowdhury et al. (2014), and Mago et al. (2015).11 
Although in the rest of this paper we mainly focus on the overbidding phenomenon and between-
subjects heterogeneity, in our analyses, we also control for learning. 
                                                 
11 For the interested readers, Parco et al. (2005), Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009), and Sheremeta (2011) examine 
within-subject learning patterns in details. 
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4.2. Earned Endowment Effects 
The focus of this study is to determine if the origin of endowment influences the degree 
of overbidding in contests. Table 1 shows that subjects bid 16% less in the Yardstick treatment 
relative to the Gift treatment (36.4 versus 43.2). Similarly, subjects bid 11% less in the Earn 
treatment relative to the Gift treatment (38.6 versus 43.2). It is also clear from Figure 1 that the 
average bids in the Gift treatment are higher than the average bids in the Yardstick and Earn 
treatments over most periods of the experiment. Nonetheless, as pointed out in Harrison (2007), 
we must be careful in looking at only average bids within our treatments in a repeated 
experiment such as ours. 
To formally test the differences in bids across treatments, we use a random effects model 
with standard errors clustered at session level, where the dependent variable is the bid and the 
independent variables are treatment dummy-variables and a period trend.12 The results of the 
estimation are reported in Table 3. Specification (1) shows results for a comparison of the Gift 
treatment to the pooled data of the Earn and Yardstick treatments. 13  Subjects in the Gift 
treatment bid significantly higher than in the two treatments where they had to earn the 
endowment. This difference between the Gift and Yardstick treatment in specification (2) is 
significant. The difference between the Gift and Earn treatment in specification (3) fails to be 
                                                 
12 The properties of clustered errors are not well known when the numbers of clusters are few (see Cameron et al. 
2008). As a robustness check of our analysis we also considered additional analysis where we clustered errors at the 
subject level. The results are similar to those in Table 3 and are available from the authors upon request. 
13 For a robustness check, we also tried to control for potential wealth effects by including correct problem counts. 
The number of correct problem counts in the Yardstick and Earn treatments is not correlated with bids. Moreover, 
the estimation results on all other coefficients are virtually the same and are available from the authors upon request.  
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significant at a traditional 5 percent level (p-value = 0.11).14 Lastly, specification (4) indicates 
that bidding behavior across the Earn and Yardstick treatments is similar. 
Given that there is substantial learning, as a robustness check, we have re-estimated 
Table 3, including additional independent lag variables such as wining in period t-1(win-lag), the 
subject’s own bid in period t-1(bid-lag), and the sum of other group member’s bids in period t-1 
(otherbid-lag). The results are reported in Table 4. We find that in all four specifications a 
subject’s bid in period t is significantly positively correlated with bid-lag. Only in specification 
(4), bid is correlated with win-lag and otherbid-lag. Most importantly, even after controlling for 
lag variables designed to capture learning, we still find significant treatment effects. 
The significantly lower bids in the Earn and Yardstick treatments translate into relatively 
higher payoffs. Specifically, in the Gift treatment subjects on average lose 13.2. These loses are 
reduced in half when subjects earn their endowments (lose 6.4 in the Yardstick treatment and 8.6 
in the Earn treatment). To test whether these differences are significant we estimated similar 
models as in Table 3, with payoff (instead of bid) as a dependent variable. The results, available 
for authors upon request, indicate that the average payoff in the Gift treatment is significantly 
lower than the average payoff in the Earn and Yardstick treatments (pooled data) and the average 
payoff in the Yardstick treatment. This difference also remains significant in the second half of 
the experiment. 
 
4.3. Determinants of Bidding Behavior 
In each experimental section, we elicited information about individual preferences for 
winning (Sheremeta, 2010) and risk (Holt and Laury, 2002). Also, at the end of the experiment 
                                                 
14 Restricting our analysis to only the last 15 rounds strengthens our results. In particular, all p-values of treatment 
effects are significant with p-values < 0.08.  
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we conducted a demographic questionnaire. The survey was composed of questions regarding 
gender, religiosity, major, economics classes and age. Table 5 provides summary statistics of the 
information that we collected from subjects. Accounting for individual preferences and 
demographic differences, we find a number of interesting results. The estimation results of 
different random effect models, where the dependent variable is the bid and the independent 
variable are different individual characteristics, are reported in Table 6.15 Specifications (1)-(3) 
use random effects models, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the 
multiple decisions made by individual subjects. We also cluster the standard errors at the session 
level, as well as use controls for treatment effects (treatment dummy-variables) and learning 
(period trend). Specification (4) uses a random effects probit model. 
The estimation of specification (1) in Table 6 indicates a significant and positive 
correlation between the bid and the winning variable. The winning variable is measured by the 
bid for the prize value of 0 (the task that we presented subjects with at the end of thirty periods of 
bidding for the prize value of 120).16 The significant positive correlation between the bid and the 
winning variable suggests that subjects who value winning more make higher bids in lottery 
contests. This is consistent with previous findings of Sheremeta (2010) and Price and Sheremeta 
(2011). One may argue that the winning variable is capturing confusion instead of a utility of 
winning. The problem with such an argument is that subjects participated in the contest with 
prize of 0 after they played other contests for 30 periods. Moreover, in estimation of 
specification (1) we use the quiz variable, measuring the number of correct quiz answers, to 
                                                 
15 Due to the mass of bids at the upper and lower bounds we also considered a tobit regression as a robustness check. 
The results, including interaction effects in Table 7, were qualitatively similar and are available from the authors 
upon request. 
16 Although subjects were explicitly told that they would have to pay their bids, we still find that 28% of all subjects 
made positive bids, with an average bid of 9.1 in the Gift treatment, 6.1 in the Yardstick treatment, and 8.3 in the 
Earn treatment. Moreover, there are no statistically significant differences in bidding between three treatments (all p-
values > 0.40). 
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control for confusion.17 Although we find that subjects who understand the instructions better 
make lower bids in contests, the significant winning variable suggests that winning is a 
component in a subject’s utility. 
Another strong predictor of subjects’ behavior in contests is risk preferences. The 
estimation of specification (2) in Table 6 indicates a significant and negative correlation between 
the bid and the safe variable. The safe variable is measured by the number of safe options that 
subjects chose in the Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation task (for the details see footnote 8). A 
higher number corresponds to a higher level of risk-aversion. The significant negative safe 
coefficient indicates that more risk-averse subjects make lower bids in contests. This finding is 
consistent both with theoretical predictions of Hillman and Katz (1984) and experimental 
findings of Sheremeta (2011) and Shupp et al. (2013). 
In addition to winning and safe, in specification (3) of Table 6 we include different 
demographic characteristics summarized in Table 5. 18  The gender variable is an indicator 
variable, taking a value of 1 for women and 0 for men. The positive and significant gender 
coefficient implies that women bid more than men. This difference is substantial in magnitude 
and it is persistent throughout the duration of the experiment (see Figure 3). Remarkably, the 
gender effect is even bigger than the treatment effects (compare Figure 1 and Figure 3), with 
women making 25% higher bids than men (45.5 versus 36.3). This difference also holds across 
the treatments, with women bidding more than men in all three treatments. 19  This gender 
difference is even more surprising given that we control for other demographic characteristics as 
                                                 
17  This is a measure of how well subjects understand the instructions. Before the actual experiment, subjects 
completed the quiz on the computer to verify their understanding of the instructions. If a subject’s answer was 
incorrect, the computer provided the correct answer. The experiment started only after all participants had answered 
all quiz questions. 
18 In 3 out of 18 sessions, we did not conduct the demographic questionnaire. 
19 Results are available upon request. 
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well as individual preferences. As a result of significantly higher bids, women receive lower 
average payoffs from the contest than men (-10.5 versus -8.9).20 
Another interesting observation is that the winning coefficient becomes insignificant 
when we introduce demographic controls. This suggests that the utility of winning and 
demographic characteristics are correlated. For instance, we find that women bid twice as much 
for the prize of 0 than men (9.75 versus 4.86). The correlation between gender and winning may 
be due to women being more sensitive to the context of the experiment and they associated a bid 
of zero with doing nothing (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Even so, the fact that gender is 
significant even after controlling for winning suggests that the gender effect is not captured 
merely by women’s being more sensitive to the context of the experiment. To examine whether 
this result is impacted by women’s participation, we estimate a random effects probit model 
reported in Table 6 as specification (4), where the dependent variable is an indicator variable 
taking value of 1 if subject’s bid is greater than 1 (signifying participation) and 0 otherwise. The 
results indicate that women are more likely (although marginally) to participate in contests.21 
Moreover, bidding for 0 (measured by winning) is a significant indicator of participation in 
contests. 
Finally, we find that the religiosity variable, which measures the importance of religion in 
daily life, is significant in specification (3) of Table 6. Subjects who consider religion to be a 
very important part of their daily life make 26% lower bids in contest (32.5 versus 41.2).22 As 
                                                 
20 The lower earnings for women is not statistically significant as evidenced by a regression similar to Table 3 but 
including a female indicator. These results are available upon request.  
21 Alternatively, Morgan et al. (2012) find that when given the choice to either participate in a contest or take a sure 
payoff, females enter into the contest at a similar rate relative to males. More research into participation is indeed 
warranted given the voluminous literature which points towards female’s relative abstention from competitive 
situations (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). 
22 We asked subjects to answer the question “How important do you consider religion in your daily life?”. Subjects 
then chose one of the following answers: (1) very important, (2) somewhat important, (3) a little important, and (4) 
not at all important. We code the variable religiosity as 1 if subject’s answer was (1) and 0 otherwise. 
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with the gender effect, the religiosity effect (i.e., 26%) is bigger than the treatment effects (i.e., 
11-16%) and is persistent throughout the duration of the experiment (see Figure 4). Furthermore, 
when we control for demographic variables in specification (3), including religiosity and gender, 
we find that treatment effects are not significant, suggesting that a large portion of treatment 
effects are subsumed by the demographic effects. We further investigate religiosity and gender in 
more detail in the next sections.23 
 
4.4. Gender and Religiosity  
To more fully understand the differences in religiosity and gender we consider the fully 
interacted model in Table 7. In particular, for every independent variable included in 
specification (2) of Table 6, we interact that variable with either gender or religiosity. 
Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 7 show the estimation results of the fully interacted model 
with the gender indicator variable. Specifications (3) and (4) show the estimation results of the 
interacted model where religiosity is interacted with other independent variables. The interaction 
term, if significant, indicates that there is a difference in how the dependent variable affects 
either group in the religiosity or gender indicator variables.  
First, we focus on specifications (1) and (2) where the pertinent interaction variable is the 
gender indicator. In particular, specification (1) in Table 7 shows that there are two significant 
(although marginally) interaction variables: treatment and religiosity. The significant interaction 
of gender and treatment suggests that treatments do little to mitigate the overbidding of women 
                                                 
23 For a robustness check, we also re-estimated Table 6, including the lagged variables as in Table 4 along with 
interaction terms on gender and religiosity. Similarly to when comparing Table 3 and Table 4, the main variables of 
interest in Table 6 remain significant even after controlling for different lag variables. The only significant result 
that is new is that women’s response to otherbid-lag is different than men’s response: men’s bids in period t are 
negatively correlated with otherbid-lag, whereas women’s bids are positively correlated. The estimation results are 
available from authors upon request. 
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in the experiment. Moreover, this implies that the effect of gender partially mitigates the 
treatment effects in the experiment. The interaction term of gender and religiosity is also 
significant and positive, suggesting that women who identify themselves as very religious bid 
more than women who do not identify themselves as very religious.24 Examining specification 
(2), which includes interaction terms only for the variables which were not included on the 
demographic questionnaire, we see that the treatment variable is significant. This suggests that 
the treatment effects are at least partially mitigated by the inclusion of the demographic 
variables. 
Next, we focus on specifications (3) and (4) where the interaction variable is the 
religiosity indicator. When we consider the interaction of religiosity and other dependent 
variables in specification (3), we see that there are three significant interaction variables: safe, 
class, and gender. The results for the interaction of safe and religiosity imply that for a given 
level of risk tolerance those subjects who identify as being highly religious bid significantly less 
than those who do not identify as being highly religious. This is interesting in light of the fact 
that research has documented that religious people are usually more risk averse (Hilary and Hui, 
2009; Kumar et al., 2011). However, our findings do not necessarily suggest that religious people 
are more risk averse but that they bid lower in contests relative to others who have similar 
measured risk preferences.25 
Since we discussed the interaction of religiosity and gender previously, the last difference 
to discuss is the interaction of the number of economics classes taken and religiosity. In 
                                                 
24 It should be noted that the females who identify as highly religious (religiosity = 1) do not drive the gender result. 
In particular, if we remove the subjects who identify as highly religious and rerun the regression from Table 6 we 
see that the female indicator is still significant albeit with a the higher p-value of 0.08. These results are available by 
request. 
25 Based on a simple OLS regression with robust standard errors, we do not find a significant difference between 
risk preferences by religious and non-religious subjects (p-value = 0.39) 
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particular, the results suggest that those subjects who identify themselves as highly religious bid 
significantly more the more economics courses they take. Although interesting, this result does 
not come as a surprise. It is well recognized that students studying business and economics have 
more profit maximizing positions (Rubinstein, 2006) and they act more selfishly (Meier and 
Frey, 2004). 
In summary, it appears that both gender and religiosity significantly impact individual 
behavior in contests. In the concluding section we discuss application of these findings in 
relation to the extant literature and suggest directions for future research.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our results contribute to several areas of research. First, our study contributes to the 
discussion on how to reduce overbidding in contests and enhance efficiency. Our findings 
indicate that an important contributing factor to overbidding is the fact that subjects receive 
windfall endowments (house money) before participating in contests. When subjects earn their 
endowments the bidding decreases by 11-16%. Therefore, our results suggest that one way to 
increase efficiency in contests is simply by making subjects earn their endowments before 
participating in contests. This is particularly useful information for managers who are tasked 
with allotting costly resources to departmental units within an organization. 
Second, the results of our experiment can partially explain why subjects’ behavior in 
contests is heterogeneous, with some subjects making very high and some making very low bids. 
A usual explanation for a high variance in individual bidding behavior is that subjects have 
heterogeneous preferences towards winning (Sheremeta, 2010, 2015) and risk (Sheremeta, 2011, 
2015; Mago et al., 2013; Shupp et al., 2013). We also find that subjects’ preferences towards 
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winning and risk are significant predictors of individual bidding behavior. However, more 
importantly, we find that demographic differences, such as gender and religiosity, are significant 
sources of variation in subjects’ bidding behavior. Specifically, we find that women make 25% 
higher bids than men and subjects who consider religion to be a very important part of their daily 
life make more than 26% lower bids in contests. Remarkably, demographic effects are even 
bigger than the treatment effects, suggesting that in addition to heterogeneous preferences, a 
significant part of differences in individual bidding may be attributed to differences in 
demographic characteristics. Indeed, our results show that the treatment effects are at least 
partially mitigated by controlling for the gender effect on bidding behavior with earning the 
endowment having substantially less impact on the overbidding of women relative to men.  
This again is very important for the use and allocation of resources to departmental units 
within an organization. Just as the manager must allocate resources in a circumspect way, the 
manager must also anticipate how resources are to be used once they have been allocated within 
an organization. The evidence from this study suggests that an important aspect of this paradigm 
is to understand the preferences of those who make decisions about the use and allocation of 
costly resources. 
Third, the results pertaining to gender contribute to the large literature on gender 
differences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Specifically, our results show that in a contest setting 
women bid significantly higher relative to men. As a result, women receive lower average 
earnings than men. This may affect women’s propensity to enter freely into similar contests and 
contribute to the discussion of gender preferences for competition.26 As outlined in Niederle and 
                                                 
26 The fact that women perform in contests worse than men also suggests that there may be little demand for women 
in jobs where competition is present in wages. For details of this concern see Price (2012), where the author places 
subjects in an environment very similar to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) except that one subject (a manager) 
chooses a compensation scheme for another (a worker). 
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Vesterlund (2007), the reluctance to commit to a competitive situation may be an important 
aspect of explaining the gender-wage disparity (Blau and Kahn, 2006) and low representation of 
women in top-level corporate management (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). 
Our findings concerning gender in contests are also consistent with research on gender 
effects in auctions. Ham and Kagel (2006) and Casari et al. (2007), for example, find that women 
are more susceptible to the winner’s curse. Controlling for individual ability and other factors, 
the authors conjecture that women’s overbidding in a common value auction may reflect a 
relative lack of familiarity with competitive market interactions. Ong and Chen (2012) find that 
women overbid more than men in all-pay auctions. Overall, it seems that overbidding by women 
in auctions is a robust phenomenon (Charness and Levin, 2009; Chen et al., 2013). Although 
contests are rather different than auctions, it is intriguing to find similar gender effects in both 
environments. 
Lastly, the results regarding religiosity and bidding behavior in contests contribute to the 
growing literature on religion and economic behavior (Hoffmann, 2013). Our results show that 
subjects who consider religion to be a very important part of their daily life make 26% lower 
bids in contests than others. There are several possible explanations for the significant difference 
in behavior of religious subjects (Iannaccone, 1998). First, it is usually the case that most 
religions provoke people to care about and trust others (Tan and Vogel, 2008), as well as to be 
more pro-social (Ahmed, 2009; Benjamin et al., 2012). This may produce less competitive 
behavior in contests from more religious subjects. It is also documented in the literature that 
more religious people are more compassionate towards the disadvantaged (Batson et al., 1993; 
Regnerus et al., 1998). Therefore, one would expect that when confronted with other subjects in 
a contest, more religious subjects may yield the competition in favor of their counterparts. 
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In addition to the impact this study has on the current set of literature, this study also 
suggests advances in future research along two important dimensions. First, as noted above, we 
have investigated the impact of gender in relation to overbidding in contests. This study 
highlights a new avenue for studying gender differences in competition (e.g., Gneezy et al., 
2009). In particular, future work should consider how previous results concerning women’s 
preference to abstain from competition in wages is related to women’s overbidding in the context 
of contests. Second, given the fact that more than 60% of Americans self-classify as religious 
(Joas, 2008), it is imperative to investigate how religiosity impacts individual behavior in 
competitive environments. From the results of our experiment, it appears that religiosity is as 
important as gender in explaining individual behavior in contests. It occurs to us that 
investigations of the impact of demographic factors, such as religiosity and gender, on decisions 
in competitive environments both inside and outside the laboratory are especially fruitful and 
insightful avenues for future research.  
23 
 
References 
Ahmed, A.M. (2009). Are religious people more prosocial? A quasi-experimental study with 
Madrasah pupils in a rural community in India. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 
48, 368-374. 
Amaldoss, W. & Rapoport, A. (2009). Excessive Expenditure in Two-Stage Contests: Theory 
and Experimental Evidence. In F. Columbus (Ed.), Game Theory: Strategies, Equilibria, and 
Theorems. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers. 
Balafoutas, L., Kerschbamer, R., & Sutter, M. (2012). Distributional Preferences and 
Competitive Behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83, 125-135. 
Bartling, B., Fehr, E., Marechal, M.A., & Schunk, D. (2009). Egalitarianism and 
Competitiveness. American Economic Review, 99, 93-98. 
Batson, C., Schoenrade, P. & Ventis, W. (1993). Religion and the individual: A Social-
Psychological Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Benjamin, D.J., Choi, J.J., & Fisher, G. (2012). Religious Identity and Economic Behavior. 
Working Paper. 
Bertrand, M., & Hallock, K.F. (2001). The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs. Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, 55, 3-21. 
Blau, F., & Kahn, L.M. (2006). The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing Convergence. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 60, 45-66. 
Bull, C., Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K., (1987). Tournaments and piece rates: an experimental 
study. Journal of Political Economy, 95, 1-33. 
Cameron, A.C., Gelbach, J.B., & Miller, D.L. (2008). Bootstrap-Based Improvments For 
Inference With Clustered Errors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90, 414-427. 
Casari, M., Ham, J.C., & Kagel, J.H. (2007). Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability 
Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments. American Economic Review, 97, 1278-
1304. 
Cason, T.N., Masters, W.A. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2010). Entry into winner-take-all and 
proportional-prize contests: An experimental study. Journal of Public Economics, 94, 604-
611. 
Cason, T.N., Masters, W.A. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Winner-take-all and proportional-prize 
contests: theory and experimental results. Working paper. 
Cason, T.N., Sheremeta, R.M. & Zhang, J. (2012). Communication and Efficiency in 
Competitive Coordination Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 76, 26-43. 
Charness, G., & Levin, D. (2009). The Origins of the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study. 
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1, 207–36. 
Chen, H., Ham, S.H., & Lim, N. (2011). Designing Multiperson Tournaments with Asymmetric 
Contestants: An Experimental Study. Management Science, 57, 864-883. 
Chen, Y., Katuscak, P., & Ozdenoren, E. (2013). Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man? 
Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 181-213. 
Cherry, T.L., Frykblom, P., & Shogren, J.F., (2002). Hardnose the dictator. American Economic 
Review, 92, 1218–1221. 
Cherry, T.L., Kroll, S., & Shogren, J.F. (2005). The impact of endowment heterogeneity and 
origin on public good contributions: evidence from the lab. Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 57, 357-365. 
24 
 
Chowdhury, S.M., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests. 
Economics Letters, 112, 216-219. 
Chowdhury, S.M., Sheremeta, R.M., & Turocy, T.  (2014). Overbidding and overspreading in 
rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. Games and Economic 
Behavior, 87, 224-238. 
Clark, J. (2002). House money effects in public good experiments. Experimental Economics, 5, 
223–231. 
Clark, J., (1998). Fairness in public good provision: an investigation of preferences for equality 
and proportionality. Canadian Journal of Economics, 31, 708–729. 
Croson, R., & Gneezy U. (2009). Gender Differences in Preferences. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 45, 448-474. 
D’Avolio, G., (2002). The Market for Borrowing Stock. Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 
271–306. 
Davis, D., & Reilly, R. (1998). Do many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis 
of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer. Public Choice, 95, 89-115. 
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). A survey of experimental research on 
contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics, forthcoming. 
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011). Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, 
Preferences, and Gender. American Economic Review, 101, 556-90.  
Eckel, C.C., & Grossman, P.J. (2002). Sex Differences and Statistical Stereotyping in Attitudes 
Toward Financial Risk. Evolution and Human Behavior, 23, 281-295. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178. 
Geary, D.C. (1996). Sexual Selection and Sex Differences in Mathematical Abilities. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 19, 229-284. 
Gneezy, U., Leonard, K.L., & List, J.A. (2009). Gender differences in competition: Evidence 
from a matrilineal and patriarchal society. Econometrica, 77, 1637-1644. 
Gneezy, U., Niederle, M. & Rustichini, A. (2003). Performance in Competitive Environments: 
Gender Differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1049-1074. 
Ham, J.C., & Kagel, J.H. (2006). Gender Effects in Private Value Auctions. Economic Letters, 
92, 375-382. 
Harbring, C., & Irlenbusch, B., (2011). Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory 
Experiment. Management Science, 57, 611–627. 
Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1985). Perfect equilibrium in a model of a race. Review of Economic 
Studies, 52, 193-209. 
Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1987). Racing with uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies, 54, 1-21. 
Harrison, G. (2007). House money effects in public good experiments: Comment. Experimental 
Economics, 10, 429-437. 
Hilary, G., & Hui, K.W. (2009). Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in 
America? Journal of Financial Economics, 93, 455-473. 
Hillman, A. & Riley, J.G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and 
Politics, 1, 17-40. 
Hillman, A.L., & Katz, E. (1984). Risk-averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly 
power. Economic Journal, 94, 104-110. 
Hoffmann, R. (2013). The Experimental Economics of Religion. Journal of Economic Surveys, 
forthcoming. 
25 
 
Holt, C.A., & Laury, S.K. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic 
Review, 92, 1644-1655. 
Iannaccone, L.R. (1998). Introduction to the Economics of Religion. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 36, 1465-1495. 
Jacquemet, N. Joule, R.V., Luchini, S. & Shogren, J.F. (2009). Earned wealth, engaged bidders? 
Evidence from a second-price auction. Economics Letters, 105, 36-38. 
Joas, H. (2008). The religious situation in the United States. In Religion Monitor 2008 Europe. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Kimura, D. & Hampson, E. (1994) Cognitive pattern in men and women is influenced by 
fluctuations in sex hormones. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 3, 57-61. 
Kumar, A., Page, J.K., Spalt, O.G. (2011). Religious Beliefs, Gambling Attitudes, and Financial 
Market Outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics, 102, 671-708. 
Lazear, E.P., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts. 
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-864. 
Locke, E.A. (1978). The ubiquity of the technique of goal setting in theories of and approaches 
to employee motivation. Academy of Management Review, 1, 594-601.  
Lugovskyy, V., Puzzello, D., & Tucker, S. (2010). An Experimental Investigation of 
Overdissipation in the All Pay Auction. European Economic Review, 54, 974-997. 
Mago, S., Samek, A., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). Facing your opponents: Social Identification 
and Information Feedback in Contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming. 
Mago, S.D., Sheremeta, R.M. & Yates, A. (2013). Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic 
versus Psychological Momentum. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 287-
296. 
Meier, S., & Frey, B. (2004). Do business students make good citizens? International Journal of 
the Economics of Business, 11, 141-163. 
Millner, E.L., & Pratt, M.D. (1989). An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking. 
Public Choice, 62, 139–151. 
Morgan, J., Orzen, H., & Sefton, M. (2012). Endogenous entry into contests. Economic Theory, 
51, 435-463.  
Muehlbacher, S., & Kirchler, E. (2009). Origin of endowments in public good games: The 
impact of effort on contributions. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 2, 
59-67.  
Müller, W., & Schotter, A. (2010). Workaholics and Dropouts in Organizations. Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 8, 717-743. 
Nalebuff, B., & Stiglitz, J. (1983), Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of 
Compensation and Competition. Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 21-43. 
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men 
Compete Too Much. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 1067-1101. 
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2011). Gender and Competition. Annual Review of Economics, 
3, 601-630. 
Ong, D., & Chen, Z. (2012). Tiger Women: An All-Pay Auction Experiment on Gender 
Signaling of Desire to Win. Working Paper. 
Orrison, A., Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K. (2004). Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental 
Examination. Management Science, 50, 268-79. 
Oxoby, R.J., & Spraggon, J. (2008). Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games. Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 703-713. 
26 
 
Parco J., Rapoport A. & Amaldoss W. (2005). Two-Stage Contests with Budget Constraints: An 
Experimental Study. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 49, 320-338. 
Potters, J.C., De Vries, C.G., & Van Linden, F. (1998). An experimental examination of rational 
rent seeking. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 783-800. 
Powell, M, & Ansic, D. (1997). Gender differences in risk behavior in financial decision-
making: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 18, 605–628. 
Price, C.R. (2010). Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?: A 
(Failed) Replication. Working paper 
Price, C.R. (2012). Gender, Competition, and Managerial Decisions. Management Science, 58, 
114-122. 
Price, C.R., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Endowment Effects in Contests. Economics Letters, 111, 
271-219. 
Regnerus, M., Smith, C. & Sikkink, D. (1998). Who gives to the poor? The influence of religious 
tradition and political location on the personal generosity of Americans toward the poor. 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37, 481–493. 
Rubinstein, A. (2006). A Skeptic’s Comment on the Studies of Economics. Economic Journal, 
116, 1-9.  
Rutström, E.E., & Williams, M.B. (2000). Entitlements and fairness: an experimental study of 
distributive preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43, 75–89. 
Savikhin, A.S., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and 
Cooperative Games. Economic Inquiry, 51, 1311-1323. 
Shupp, R., Sheremeta, R.M., Schmidt, D., & Walker, J. (2013). Resource allocation contests: 
Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 257-267. 
Schotter, A. & Weigelt, K. (1992). Asymmetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, and 
affirmative action: Some experimental results. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 511-
539. 
Sheremeta, R.M. & Zhang. J. (2010). Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in 
Contests? Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 175-197. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2010). Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests. 
Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 731-747. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation. Economic Inquiry, 49, 
573–590. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 27, 491-514. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding 
in Rent-Seeking Contests. Working Paper. 
Szidarovszky, F., & Okuguchi, K. (1997). On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash 
Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 18, 135-140. 
Tan, J.H.W., & Vogel, C. (2008). Religion and trust: An experimental study. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 29, 832-848. 
Thaler, R., & Johnson, E. (1990). Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: the 
effects of prior outcomes on risky choice. Management Science, 36, 643–660.  
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient Rent Seeking. In James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon 
Tullock, (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, pp. 97-112. 
  
27 
 
Table 1: Average Bids and Payoffs 
 
Treatment 
Average 
 Endowment 
Average 
 Bid 
Average 
 Payoff 
Equilibrium  22.5 7.5 
Gift $20.00 (0.0) 43.2 (0.8) -13.2 (1.1) 
Yardstick $20.00 (0.0) 36.4 (0.7) -6.4 (1.1) 
Earn $18.53 (0.1) 38.6 (0.8) -8.6 (1.1) 
The standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Between-Subjects and Within-Subject Variation 
 
Treatment Gift Yardstick Earn 
 Between-Subjects Variation 
Periods 1-15  30.4 (0.7) 32.0 (0.7) 33.8 (0.7) 
Periods 16-30 31.9 (0.7) 28.6 (0.7) 31.7 (0.7) 
 Within-Subject Variation 
Periods 1-15  18.5 (0.8) 16.3 (0.8) 16.7 (0.8) 
Periods 16-30 15.0 (0.8) 12.1 (0.7) 13.9 (0.8) 
The standard errors are in parentheses. The between-subjects 
variation measure is calculated as the absolute difference between 
the individual bid in period t and the average group bid in period t, 
averaged over all periods of the experiment. The within-subject 
variation measure is calculated as the absolute difference between 
the individual bid in period t and period t-1, averaged over all 
periods of the experi  
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Table 3: Treatment Effects  
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable, bid 
Gift vs. 
Yardstick & Earn 
Gift vs. 
Yardstick 
Gift vs. 
Earn 
Yardstick vs. 
Earn 
gift 5.70** 6.80** 4.60 
 
     [1 if Gift] (2.83) (2.97) (2.95) 
 
yardstick  
  
-2.20 
     [1 if Yardstick]  
  
(1.61) 
period -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.36*** 
     [period trend, t] (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
constant 42.17*** 40.84*** 42.61*** 44.15*** 
 
(1.63) (2.23) (1.91) (1.96) 
Observations 6480 4320 4320 4320 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the session level. All models include a random effects error 
structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple 
decisions made by individual subjects. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Treatment Effects and Learning 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable, bid 
Gift vs. 
Yardstick & Earn 
Gift vs. 
Yardstick 
Gift vs. 
Earn 
Yardstick vs. 
Earn 
gift 2.36** 2.64** 1.91 
      [1 if Gift] (1.17) (1.18) (1.25) 
 yardstick  
  
-0.98 
     [1 if Yardstick]  
  
(0.68) 
period -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.18*** 
     [period trend, t] (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
win-lag 1.00 0.19 0.64 2.22** 
      [1 if win in t-1] (1.08) (1.37) (1.47) (1.08) 
bid-lag 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 
      [bid in period t-1] (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
otherbid-lag -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02** 
      [sum of opponents’ bids in period t-1] (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
constant 16.81*** 15.50*** 17.20*** 18.57*** 
 
(1.62) (1.89) (2.00) (2.00) 
Observations 6264 4176 4176 4176 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the session level. All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual 
subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects. 
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Table 5: Summary of Demographic Characteristics and Preferences 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
winning bid for the prize of 0 7.85 22.50 0 120 
quiz number of correct quiz answers 7.13 1.01 2 8 
safe number of safe options 9.35 2.47 1 15 
gender woman or man 0.35 0.48 0 1 
religiosity religion is very important 0.19 0.39 0 1 
denomination Christian or other 0.48 0.50 0 1 
major business or econ major 0.30 0.46 0 1 
classes number of econ classes taken 3.50 4.13 0 25 
age participant’s age 20.85 1.80 18 33 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Determinants of Bids 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable bid bid bid I(bid > 1) 
earn -5.59** -5.59** -5.39 -0.33 
     [1 if Earn] (2.83) (2.85) (3.38) (0.32) 
yardstick -3.58 -3.64 -2.77 -0.12 
     [1 if Yardstick] (2.92) (2.90) (3.10) (0.33) 
period -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.36*** -0.02*** 
     [period trend, t] (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.00) 
winning 0.15** 0.14** 0.11 0.02*** 
     [bid for the prize of 0] (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.01) 
quiz -5.41*** -5.64*** -4.95*** 0.09 
     [number of correct quiz answers] (1.71) (1.65) (1.84) (0.13) 
safe  -2.14*** -1.92*** -0.12** 
     [number of safe options]  (0.56) (0.62) (0.06) 
gender   7.14*** 0.51* 
     [1 if woman]   (2.76) (0.29) 
religiosity   -7.90*** -0.57 
     [1 if religion is very important]   (2.84) (0.35) 
denomination   -3.83 -0.33 
     [1 if Christian]   (2.41) (0.27) 
major   -1.74 0.38 
     [1 if business or econ major]   (4.18) (0.35) 
classes   -0.28 -0.04 
     [number of econ classes taken]   (0.57) (0.04) 
age   -1.20* 0.06 
     [participant’s age]   (0.68) (0.09) 
constant 84.50*** 106.25*** 134.71*** 1.50 
 
(13.14) (14.26) (18.26) (1.92) 
Observations 6480 6480 5400 5400 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Specifications (1)-(3) use 
random effects models, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the 
multiple decisions made by individual subjects. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
at the session level. Specification (4) uses a random effects probit model. 
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Table 7: Interaction Models 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable, bid I = gender I = gender I = religiosity I = religiosity 
gender -28.53 10.12 5.15* 5.24** 
     [1 if woman] (59.36) (32.58) (2.76) (2.58) 
I × gender    19.40*** 24.22*** 
     [interaction term]   (6.30) (6.38) 
religiosity -11.06***  -9.01 -59.86 
     [1 if religion is very important] (2.87)  (53.45) (41.05) 
I × religiosity  14.46*    
     [interaction term] (8.34)    
treatment -6.13 -7.80** -4.66 -4.43 
     [1 if Earn or Yardstick] (3.75) (3.52) (3.32) (3.65) 
I × treatment 8.19* 10.11** -6.39 -2.28 
     [interaction term] (4.57) (4.60) (6.01) (7.01) 
period -0.37*** -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
     [period trend, t] (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
I × period 0.03 -0.05 -0.26 -0.26 
     [interaction term] (0.26) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30) 
winning 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.09 
     [bid for the prize of 0] (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) 
I × winning 0.19 0.10 0.23 0.42** 
     [interaction term] (0.21) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) 
quiz -4.17* -4.96** -5.51*** -6.13*** 
     [number of correct quiz answers] (2.32) (2.18) (1.92) (1.64) 
I × quiz -2.56 -1.67 6.39 10.35** 
     [interaction term] (3.59) (3.32) (4.11) (4.18) 
safe -1.73* -2.33*** -1.40* -1.48* 
     [number of safe options] (1.00) (0.69) (0.79) (0.76) 
I × safe -0.59 0.27 -2.97** -2.60* 
     [interaction term] (1.29) (1.07) (1.31) (1.50) 
denomination -1.46  -2.87  
     [1 if Christian] (3.17)  (2.93)  
I × denomination -5.73  -3.42  
     [interaction term] (4.13)  (7.28)  
major -0.15  -1.91  
     [1 if business or econ major] (6.08)  (4.14)  
I × major  -1.38  -9.58  
     [interaction term] (11.58)  (8.66)  
classes -0.04  -0.59  
     [number econ classes taken] (0.93)  (0.48)  
I × classes -0.49  4.40***  
     [interaction term] (1.04)  (1.27)  
age -1.86**  -0.90  
     [participant’s age] (0.82)  (0.70)  
I × age  2.63  -1.21  
     [interaction term] (2.50)  (1.76)  
constant 134.00*** 102.99*** 121.49*** 103.47*** 
 
(26.98) (19.36) (16.63) (14.90) 
Observations 5400 5400 5400 5400 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The standard errors in parentheses.  All 
models include a random effects specification on subject and clustered errors at the session level.  
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Figure 1: Average Bid Over 30 Periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the Average Bid by Subject in Each Treatment 
 
 
 
Note: Subjects are sorted in increasing order by the average bid, which is indicated by solid 
line. The error bars represent standard deviations of bids for each subject over all 30 periods.  
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Figure 3: Average Bid by Gender (All Treatments Combined) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Average Bid by Religiosity (All Treatments Combined) 
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Appendix (Not for publication) – Instructions for Treatment Earn 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them closely and make appropriate 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in four parts. The currency used in Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment is U.S. 
Dollars. The currency used in Parts 3 and 4 of the experiment is francs.  At the end of the experiment, francs will be 
converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _60_ francs to _1_ dollar. Your earnings today will be calculated as the sum of 
your earnings in each part of the experiment. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in 
cash. 12 participants are in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation.  
At this time we will proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How 
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not 
designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what 
you really would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that 
there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment. You do not know 
which line will be paid when you make your choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in 
every line. After you have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage 
containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, 
you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings 
in the case you chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo 
cage now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in 
the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number 
shows up in the right column you earn $0. 
Are there any questions? 
 
Deci
sion 
no. 
Opti
on A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3 never $0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
2 $1 $3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage $0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
3 $1 $3 if 1 or 2 $0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
4 $1 $3 if 1,2,3 $0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
5 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4, $0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
 6 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5 $0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
7 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6 $0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
8 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
9 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
10 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
 11 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 $0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 $0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
For this part of the experiment you will be asked to calculate the sum of five randomly generated two-digit 
numbers. You will be given 10 minutes to calculate the correct sum for a series of these problems. You cannot use a 
calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to use the supplied scratch paper. You submit an answer 
by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer, the computer will immediately tell you 
whether your answer is correct or not and supply another summation problem. I will give notice when 30 seconds 
remain. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
You will receive $1 per problem that you correctly solve within the 10 minutes. Your payment does not 
decrease if you provide an incorrect answer to a problem.   
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 3 
YOUR DECISION 
You may have already earned some money from the first part of the experiment, although we will 
determine how much at the conclusion of the experiment.  In addition to this amount, you have also earned some 
money from the second part of the experiment.  In part 3 of the experiment, you may receive either positive or 
negative earnings. 
The third part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the beginning of each period, 
you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 participants. The composition of your group will 
be changed randomly every period. The reward is worth 120 francs to you and the other three participants in your 
group. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 120 (including 0.5 decimal points). An example of 
your decision screen is shown below. 
 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of 
who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. Thus, your period earnings will be calculated in 
the following way: 
 If you receive the reward:      Earnings = Reward – Your Bid = 120 – Your Bid 
 If you do not receive the reward:      Earnings = No Reward – Your Bid = 0 – Your Bid 
Remember, in the first and second part of this experiment you have earned money.  In this part of the 
experiment, depending on a period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the 
experiment we will randomly select 5 out of 30 periods for actual payment.  You will sum the total earnings for 
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these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment.  If the earnings are negative, we will subtract them from 
your earnings.  If the earnings are positive, we will add them to your earnings. 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participants in your 
group bid, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one 
lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 
4 participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 120 francs. Thus, 
your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs 
all 4 participants in your group bid. 
Your chance of 
receiving a reward 
= 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 4 Bids in your group 
If all participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the four participants in the group. 
 
Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw. Let’s say 
participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, participant 3 bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs. 
Therefore, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets 
to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 
65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. 
Participant 2 has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 chance, and participant 3 has 0 = 0/65 chance 
of receiving the reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who 
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you 
received the reward or not. 
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether you received the reward or 
not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is 
displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate 
heading. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of 
each period you will be randomly re-grouped with three other participants to from a four-person group. You can 
never guarantee yourself the reward. However, by increasing your bid, you can increase your chance of receiving 
the reward. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. 
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At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment in Part 3 
using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
Are there any questions? 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 4 
The fourth part of the experiment consists of only 1 decision-making period and only one stage. The rules 
for part 4 are the same as the rules for part 3. At the beginning of the period, you will be randomly and 
anonymously placed into a group of four participants. You will bid in order to be a winner. The only difference is 
that in part 4 the winner does not receive the reward. Therefore, the reward is worth 0 francs to you and the other 
three participants in your group. After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are 
calculated. 
Earnings = 0 – Your Bid 
After all participants have made their decisions, you will learn whether you win or not. The computer then 
will display your earnings for the period on the outcome screen. Your earnings will be converted to cash and paid at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
